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Populism, Backlash and the Ongoing Use of
the World Trade Organization Dispute
Settlement System: State Responses to the
Appellate Body Crisis
IMOGEN SAUNDERS†

ABSTRACT
Since 2017, World Trade Organization (‘WTO’)
Member States have been unable to reach a consensus on
Appellate Body (‘AB’) appointments and reappointments.
The United States is spearheading a populist backlash
against procedural and substantive aspects of the dispute
settlement system of the WTO. As a consequence of this, the
AB is now facing an unprecedented crisis. The jewel in the
crown of the WTO dispute settlement system will be
missing: yet countries are still bringing complaints. This
paper considers US actions through the framing of
populism and backlash, and assesses responses from other
countries.
I. INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization’s (‘WTO’) Appellate Body
(‘AB’) was once considered the ‘jewel in the crown’ of the WTO
dispute settlement system. The WTO came into being in 1995, almost
50 years after the ill-fated Havana Charter—intended to establish the
International Trade Organization (‘ITO’)—failed to gain US
Congressional Approval and subsequently never came into force.
© 2020 Imogen Saunders.
†
Senior Lecturer, ANU Law School, Australian National University.
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While the ITO floundered, the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (‘GATT’) did come into force: but without an institutional body
overseeing it, or an agreed dispute settlement system, it operated in a
quasi-legal, diplomatic fashion. Swathes of trade areas were excluded
in practice from its purview, and disputes were managed by ad-hoc
arbitration panels and governed by principles of consensus. A panel
was only formed if all GATT members (including the State accused of
breaching the treaty) agreed: and its findings only adopted on the same
basis. By the time the Uruguay Round began in 1986, with the object
of creating a new international trade institution, it was obvious that a
more rigorous dispute settlement system was needed. The WTO
dispute settlement system has two key differences from the GATT
years.
First, rather than disputes being decided by an arbitral panel
alone, a two-stage appellate process was adopted. Disputes are heard
in the first instance by a WTO panel, formed on an ad-hoc basis for
each dispute. From the panel decision there is an automatic right of
appeal to the AB. The AB is a permanent body, intended to consist of
seven members, three of which sit to hear any given appeal. While
panel members do not need legal qualifications, AB members must be
‘a person of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law,
international trade and the subject-matter of the covered agreements
generally’.1 The permanence of the AB means there is consistency in
the law; and the legal qualifications of its members has seen it acting
more like a true international court than an ad-hoc arbitral panel more
concerned with finding an outcome satisfactory to both parties than the
rigorous application of the law. For example, although as in all
international courts, precedence as understood in domestic systems
does not apply, the AB nonetheless has made clear that it both expects
WTO panels to follow previous AB reasoning where relevant, and that
the AB itself will, in usual circumstances, follow its own previous
reasoning.
Second, the model of consensus has been flipped. WTO panels
are now automatically formed unless there is consensus not do so –
including agreement from the State who has brought the dispute in the
first place. Similarly, reports from the WTO Panels and the AB are
automatically adopted, unless there is consensus not to adopt
(including from the State who has ‘won’ the case). This essentially
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2:
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art 17.3., 1867
UNTS 3, (1995).
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ended the opt-out nature of dispute settlement during the GATT years,
and created a compulsory dispute settlement system in its place.
For over twenty years this system worked fairly well – albeit with
grumblings regarding delays, as the time taken for delivery of WTO
Panel and AB reports routinely exceeded the (one could say overly
optimistic) timelines set in the Dispute Settlement Understanding.2 In
some ways, the dispute system was a victim of its own success: as the
case load increased, the ability of the system to deal with matters in a
timely fashion decreased. However, the situation facing the WTO
dispute system today is wholly different. It is facing ‘unprecedented
challenges’3 – stripped of its intended seven members to only one, and
unable to hear appeals. Crucially, as WTO panel reports are not
binding if appealed, the crippling of the AB is in fact the crippling of
the dispute settlement system as a whole. Without a functioning AB,
there is no institutional capacity to provide binding dispute settlement
results. Parties to a dispute may agree not to appeal (thus allowing the
WTO panel report to be binding); or to go outside the system to
alternative arbitration in lieu of appeal: but any such options cannot be
compelled by either the WTO or other States. The compulsory and
binding dispute resolution system established in 1994 has effectively
been broken.
Much has been written on this issue, looking at causes (including
the legitimacy of the US complaints) as well as potential solutions.4
This article instead focusses on understanding the current situation
through the twin frameworks of populism and backlash, as well as
interrogating what States have actually done in response to the crisis.
To do so, the article will first briefly set out the events that have led to
the incapacitation of the WTO AB. It will then consider the challenge
2. See Louise Johannesson & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Dispute Settlement System
1995-2016: A Data Set and Its Descriptive Statistics, 51 J. WORLD TRADE 357 (2017) (for an
overview of the difference between the treaty limits and actual time taken).
3. Ujal Singh Bhatia, Statement by Appellate Body Chair (June 22, 2018).
4. See Jennifer Hillman, Three Approaches to Fixing the World Trade Organization’s
Appellate Body: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly?, GEORGETOWN U. LAW CTR. (2018),
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Hillman-Good-Bad-UglyFix-to-WTO-AB.pdf; Elvire Fabry & Erik Tate, Saving the WTO Appellate Body or Returning
to the Wild West of Trade? NOTRE EUR. (June 7, 2018), http://institutdelors.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/SavingtheWTOAppellateBody-FabryTate-June2018.pdf; Cosette D.
Creamer, Can International Trade Law Recover? From the WTO’s Crown Jewel to its Jewel
of Crowns, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 51 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2019.1; Alex Ansong,
The WTO Appellate Body: Are There Any Viable Solutions?, 14(4) GLOBAL TRADE AND
CUSTOMS J. 169 (2019); JENS LEHNE, CRISIS AT THE WTO: IS THE BLOCKING OF APPOINTMENTS
TO THE WTO APPELLATE BODY BY THE UNITED STATES LEGALLY JUSTIFIED? (Carl Grossman
ed., 2019).
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through the lens of populism and against the context of backlashes to
other international courts. It will finally engage in analysis of use of
the AB during the relevant time period and consider why States
continue to use the DSU.
II. EVENTS LEADING TO INCAPACITATION
In May 2016, the US made waves when it did not support the reappointment of South Korean Judge Seung Wha Chang. The US had
previously blocked appointments of US judges, but never the national
of another country.5 The reasons given included that he served on
appeals that included too much obiter dicta,6 engaged in abstract
decisions,7 went beyond the arguments of the parties;8 and made a
‘problematic and erroneous approach to reviewing a Member’s
domestic law’.9 This was met with international concern and
condemnation from other States as well as the sitting and former AB
members.10 Ultimately, Hyun Chong Kim was appointed to replace
Seung Wha Chang on 23 November, along with Hong Zhao to replace
Yuiejiao Zhang. It seemed the normal functioning of the Appellate
Body appointment process had been restored.
This was, however, a short-lived respite. The US has adopted a
policy of deliberately blocking new appointments and re-appointments
from June 2017 – December 2019. On 30 June 2017, Ricardo RamirezHernandez’s second term expired, and no replacement member was
elected. On 1 August 2017 Hyun Chong Kim resigned to take up the
position of Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy in the South Korean
Government. No replacement member was elected to fill this vacancy.
This was followed by the expiration of Peter Van den Bossche’s
second term on 11 December 2017. Again, no replacement was
appointed. On 3 September 2018, Shree Baboo Chekitan’s reappointment was blocked: leaving three members left on the Appellate
Body. This is the minimum number to function, and although the
already burdensome workload increased with less members, the AB
5. The U.S. blocked the reappointment of Jennifer Hillman in 2011 and the proposed
appointment of James Gathii in 2013.
6. Statement by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
(2016), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/us_statment_dsbmay16_e.pdf.
7. Id. at 4.
8. Id. at 4-5.
9. Id. at 5.
10. See letter from Ambassador Xavier Carim Of South Africa to Chairman of Dispute
Settlement
Body,
World
Trade
Organization,
dated
May
31,
2016,
https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/files/abletter.pdf.
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continued its work.
However, at midnight on 10 December 2019, the terms of Ujal
Singh Bhatia and Thomas R Graham expired, leaving Hong Zhao as
the only remaining AB member. It seems unlikely any consensus will
be reached to fill these vacancies – or indeed any of the six positions
now vacant. The stated reasons for US actions in blocking
appointments has changed very little since the blocking of Hyun
Chong Kim in 2017. They were articulated in a July 2019 statement
of the Office of the US Trade Representative on the Appellate Report
on China – Countervailing Duties:
This report also illustrates the concerns the United States has been
raising about the Appellate Body’s functioning, including adding to
WTO Member obligations and diminishing their rights, exceeding the
mandatory 90-day deadline for reports, permitting individuals to
continue to serve on appeals past the end of their terms, engaging in
fact-finding on appeal, and treating prior reports as precedent.11
Although there is some suggestion that other countries share (at
least some of) these concerns,12 there has been no public support for
the US actions in blocking appointments from other WTO members.
III. THE AB CRISIS THROUGH THE LENS OF POPULISM
There are many differing definitions and conceptions of
populism: different fields may have different understandings of the
term, and discussions of populism may vary wildly as a result.13 In
particular, there is a schism between thick and thin populism. Thick
populism draws from historical practice and intrinsically links the term
with certain political positions historically identified as populist.14 Thin
populism, in contrast, divorces the term from the content of the
political position and instead focusses on the method: populism as a
‘way of “doing politics”‘.15 For both thick and thin conceptions of
populism, certain elements can be pulled out to analyze the current AB

11. Statement on WTO Appellate Report on China Countervailing Duties, Office of the
United States Trade Representative (16 July 2019), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2019/july/statement-wto-appellate-report-china.
12. See Creamer, supra note 5, at 52.
13. See Mark A. Graber, Thick and Thin: Interdisciplinary Conversations on Populism,
Law, Political Science, and Constitutional Change, 90 GEO. L.J. 233 (2001).
14. Id. at 234.
15. Janne E. Nijman & Wouter E. Werner, Populism and International Law: What
Backlash and Which Rubicon?, 49 NETH. J. of INT’L L. 3, 6 (2018).
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crisis.
A. Thick Populism: Producerism and Anti-Elitism
There are there central elements of populism over time:
‘producerism, religiosity, and anti-elitism’.16 Two of these –
producerism and anti-elitism – are most directly relevant.
Populist producerism is the belief that “only those who created
wealth in tangible, material ways (on and under the land, in workshops,
on the sea) could be trusted to guard the nation’s piety and liberties.”17
In contrast, elites are viewed as ‘everything that devout producers . . .
were not: condescending, profligate, artificial, effete, manipulative,
given to intellectual instead of practical thinking, and dependent on the
labor of others.’18
With this in mind, we can consider a statement made by President
Trump as he campaigned in 2016. Against the backdrop of a metals
recycling facility (a producer), he stated:
So today I’m going to talk about how to make America wealthy
again. We have to do it. With 30-miles from Steel City, Pittsburgh
played a central role in building our nation. The legacy of Pennsylvania
steelworkers lives in the bridges, railways and skyscrapers that make
up our a great American landscape. [sic]
But our workers’ loyalty was repaid, you know it better than
anybody, with total betrayal. Our politicians have aggressively pursued
a policy of globalization, moving our jobs, our wealth and our factories
to Mexico and overseas. Globalization has made the financial elite,
who donate to politicians, very, very wealthy.19
The message is clear: the producers have been betrayed by the
elites – both financial and political. The same primacy of producers is
evident in President Trump’s November 2019 speech at the Economic
Club of New York, where he stated ‘We have ended the war on
American workers, we have stopped the assault on American
industry…’20 The political elites are once again criticized: ‘They
16. Mark A. Graber, The Law Professor as Populist, 34 U. OF RICH. L. REV. 373, 387
(2000).
17. MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (Cornell
University Press 1995).
18. Id. at 15. See also, Graber, supra note 17, at 387-388.
19. Time Staff, Read Donald Trump’s Speech on Trade, TIME (June 28, 2016),
https://time.com/4386335/donald-trump-trade-speech-transcript/.
20. Remarks by President Trump at the Economic Club of New York, White House
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passed the disastrous trade deals that encouraged the shuttering of
American plants and the offshoring of American jobs by the
millions. In short, the failed political class sold out American workers,
sold out American prosperity, and sold out the American Dream.’21
The background of current US trade policy then clearly resonates
with two of the elements of thick populism. Some of the specific issues
raised by the US as justifications for actions taken in blocking
appointments to the AB can also be analyzed along these lines. Under
this view of populism, populists are ‘anti-establishment; they are
cynical of existing institutions such as … courts [and] prefer to put
their faith in the wisdom and virtues of ordinary people.’22 The US has
repeatedly criticized the doctrine of precedent that has developed at the
AB. In July 2019, the US Ambassador to the WTO commented to the
WTO General Council:
With regard to precedent, the Facilitator’s Report highlights the
widely divergent views among Members on the value of prior
Appellate Body reports. The Report suggests agreement among
Members that “precedent” is not created through WTO dispute
settlement. Yet, time and again, some Members insist that a panel
must adhere to the interpretation in past Appellate Body reports. And,
time and again, the Appellate Body insists that panels must adhere to
past reports absent undefined “cogent reasons”, a term that appears
nowhere in the DSU. These assertions on the value of interpretations
in prior reports are, as we have explained, directly contrary to the DSU
and the WTO Agreement.23
A rail against precedent can be understood through the lens of
populism as an attempt to restrict the power and law-creating ability of
a court – and not just any court, but an international one, even further
removed from the ordinary American people. The same can be said
for the US insistence on deference to domestic methods in trade
remedy investigations, most notably the practice of zeroing in dumping
investigations. The criticisms are about stripping power from an
institution of elites and returning it (at least one step closer) to the
(November 12, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presidenttrump-economic-club-new-york-new-york-ny/.
21. Id.
22. Albert W. Dzur & Carolyn M. Hendriks, Thick populism: democracy-enhancing
popular participation, POLICY STUDIES 334, 336 (2018).
23. Dennis Shea, Statements Delivered by Ambassador Dennis Shea – WTO General
Council Meeting July 23, 2019, U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, July
23, 2019, https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/07/23/statements-delivered-by-ambassadordennis-shea-wto-general-council-meeting-july-23-2019/.
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people.
B. Thin Populism: Differentiation, Fracture and Othering
Thin populism, as defined by Nijman and Werner, is a ‘thincentered ideology that can be – and indeed has been – linked to
different political agendas.’24 What matters here is how politics is done,
not the substantive agenda being sought. Nijman and Werner identify
two ways of doing politics that align with populism. First, and
overlapping with thick populism, a technique of ‘mutually
constitutive’ opposition between the elite and the ordinary person, such
that content is created primarily through ‘differentiation and fracture’
rather than particular substantive goals.25 Second, ‘a practice of
‘othering’ rather than that it aims to serve the health and cohesion of
the civitas and polity as a whole’.26
Just as with thick populism, the positioning of the US’s policies
and tactics as anti-global elite is clear. The second feature of thin
populism is also present: in that the US position is unashamedly
positioned to serve (perceived) US interests no matter the cost to the
wider international community as a whole. Although President Trump
insisted at the World Economic Forum in 2018 that ‘American First
does not mean America alone’,27 on the issue of blocking appointments
to the AB, America is very much alone. At a meeting of the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body (‘DSB’) on 18 December 2019, a proposal
was circulated calling the launch of selection processes to fill all six
vacancies. The proposal stresses the ‘urgency and importance of
filling the vacancies in the Appellate Body’ and has the support of 91
WTO members including the EU, China and Russia.28 A similar
24. Janne E. Nijman & Wouter E. Werner, Populism and International Law: What
Backlash and Which Rubicon?, 49 NETH. J. of INT’L L. 3, 6 (2018).
25. Lukasz Gruszczynski & Jessica Lawrence, Trump, International Trade and
Populism, 49 NETH. J. of INT’L L.19, 23 (2018); Nijman & Werner, supra note 25, at 6.
26. See Nijman & Werner, supra note 25, at 6.
27. Donald Trump, President Trump’s Davos Address in Full, WORLD ECON. F. (January
26,
2018),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/president-donald-trumps-davosaddress-in-full-8e14ebc1-79bb-4134-8203-95efca182e94/.
28. Proposal by Afghanistan; Angola; Argentina; Australia; Benin; Plurinational State
Of Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cabo Verde; Cameroon; Canada;
Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Congo; Costa Rica; Côte D’ivoire;
Cuba; Democratic Republic Of Congo; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El
Salvador; Eswatini; The European Union; Gabon; The Gambia; Ghana; Guatemala; Guinea;
Guinea-Bissau; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Israel; Kazakhstan;
Kenya; Republic Of Korea; Lesotho; Liechtenstein; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia;
Maldives; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; New
Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; North Macedonia; Norway; Pakistan; Panama; Paraguay;
Peru; Qatar; Russian Federation; Rwanda; Senegal; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Singapore;
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proposal in October had the support of 115 WTO members.29 No
country has spoken out in support of the US actions. In contrast, the
lack of appointments has been described as ‘deeply concerning’,30
‘alarming’31 and the US actions as an ‘illegal blockage’.32
IV. BACKLASHES TO INTERNATIONAL COURTS
It is clear then that the US actions can be viewed as stemming
from a populist position. Can we also view them as a backlash to the
WTO? Just as with populism, definitions here are important. In the
context of international courts, Madsen, Cebulak and Wiebusch
differentiate between ‘push back’ and ‘backlash’:
We thus define pushback as ordinary resistance occurring within
the confines of the system but with the goal of reversing developments
in law. We define backlash as extraordinary resistance challenging the
authority of an IC with the goal of not only reverting to an earlier
situation of the law, but also transforming or closing the IC.33
The actions of the US in blocking reappointments is more than
mere pushback: it is not acting within the system but is rather crippling
the functionality of the system. It is seeking to transform the way that
the AB operates. Although specific decisions and disagreement over
substantive points of law have been singled out by the US, Madsen et
al explain that a backlash can be triggered by a single decision: but are
‘energized by broader social and political cleavages, which also
explain the choice of the extraordinary measures’.34 Caron and Shirlow
offer a definition of backlash as ‘intense and sustained public
disapproval of a system accompanied by aggressive steps to resist the
system and to remove its legal force’.35 This is exactly what the US
South Africa; Switzerland; The Separate Customs Territory Of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen And
Matsu; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; Ukraine; Uruguay; The
Bolivarian Republic Of Venezuela; Viet Nam; Zambia and Zimbabwe. See Appellate Body
Appointments, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.15 (6 December 2019).
29. See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William
Rappard on 15 August 2019, WTO Doc WT/DSB/M/433 (29 October 2019).
30. Id. at ¶10.3.
31. Id. at ¶10.30.
32. Id. at ¶10.14.
33. Mikael Rask Madsen et al., Backlash against International Courts: Explaining the
Forms and Patterns of Resistance to International Courts, 14 INT’L. J. OF L. 197, 203 (2018).
34. Id.
35. David Caron & Esm. . . Shirlow, Dissecting Backlash: The Unarticulated Causes of
Backlash and its Unintended Consequences, in Andreas Follesdal and Geir Ulfstein, The
Judicilization of International Law: A Mixed Blessing? 159, 160 (Oxford University Press,
2018).
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actions have done – by removing the avenue to appeal panel decisions,
the legal force of the WTO dispute settlement system has been
removed.
A backlash against international courts is not necessarily new –
this has been written about in the human rights context with both the
‘Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash’;36 and international courts in
West, East and Southern Africa.37 There are generally two types of
ways that a country will express disapproval with an international
court. The first way is threaten to leave the court system. Examples of
countries that have followed through with this threat are Venezuela
pulling out of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Rwanda
leaving the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Burundi
leaving the International Criminal Court.38 Such exits have mostly had
very little impact on the court itself.
The second way is to interfere with the functioning of the Court
– as is being done in the WTO. This has been seen before in the context
of the South African Development Community Tribunal (‘SADCT’) –
Zimbabwe’s action in blocking reappointments (along with
withdrawing itself from the SADCT) had the end result of effectively
terminating the SADCT.39 This example raises an interesting point of
comparison because Zimbabwe was very open about wanting to end
the SADCT. The US however is seeking reform of the WTO, not
termination of the institution: yet its actions have effectively halted the
functioning of part of it. Regardless, the actions certainly fit
definitions of backlash generally and those specific to international
courts. How then have countries reacted to the situation caused by the
US backlash?
V. STATE RESPONSES
In his farewell speech to the WTO, former AB member Peter Van
Den Bossche looked to the then future possibility that the AB would
cease functioning:
One can predict with confidence that, once the Appellate Body is
36. See Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations
Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash against Human Rights Regimes, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002).
37. See Karen J. Alter et al., Backlash Against International Courts in West, East and
Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences, 27 EUROPEAN J. OF INT’L L. 293 (2016).
38. Erik Voeten, Populism and Backlashes against International Courts, PERSPECTIVES
ON POLITICS 1, 2 (2019).
39. Id.
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paralyzed, the losing party will in most cases appeal the panel report
and thus prevent it from becoming legally binding. Why would WTO
members still engage in panel proceedings if panel reports are likely to
remain unadopted and thus not legally binding?40
However, the breaking of the WTO AB has seemed inevitable for
some time. Countries are nevertheless still initiating complaints within
the dispute settlement system. As Ambassador Sunanta Kangvalkulkij,
the 2018 DSB chair noted:
The DSB is facing a unique situation, even contradictory. On the
one hand, the ongoing impasse on the appointment of the vacant
Appellate Body Members questions the survival of the dispute
settlement system as we know it. On the other, dispute settlement
activity has been on the rise, emphasizing the WTO Members’ reliance
on the system. This somewhat contradictory situation has seen DSB
activity significantly boosted during 2018.41
2018 was of course an extraordinary year. The US tariffs on steel
and aluminum saw a massive number of cases lodged in protest.
Retaliatory tariffs placed on US goods by countries were met with
cases lodged by the US. But even taking 2018 as an outlier, case
numbers show that the US blocking of AB appointments has not (yet)
impacted use of the WTO dispute settlement system. Although there
is a general downward trend in use (as seen in figure 1, below), this
trend has not accelerated since 2017.

40. Peter Van den Bosshe, Farewell Speech of Appellate Body Member Peter Van den
Bosshe,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION
(May
28,
2019),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/farwellspeech_peter_van_den_bossche_e.htm.
41. Sunata Kangvalkulkij, WTO Dispute Settlement Body – Developments in 2018,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION
(April
10,
2019),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/sunata_19_e.htm.

SAUNDERS (DO NOT DELETE)

2/21/21 1:11 PM

2020] POPULISM, BACKLASH, AND WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYS. 183

Figure 1: Number of WTO disputes by year
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Three cases from 2017 (DS523,42 DS52943 and DS53444) and one
from 2018 (DS541) have resulted in a panel report.45 No case brought
in 2019 has reached the stage of a panel report yet. States must have
known when bringing a case that – prior to 11 December 2019 – they
were facing at least a two year wait until a report would be handed
down, and longer than that for the appellate process to take place. Now
the timeline is even more unsure. Yet States kept bringing requests for
consultations from 2017 to the current day.
Some countries acknowledge this reality publicly. For example,
the EU requested consultations with the United States regarding
countervailing and antidumping duties the United States had imposed
on Spanish olives on 29 January 2019.46 At the time, European
42. Panel Report, United States — Countervailing Measures on Certain Pipe and Tube
Products (Turkey), WTO Doc. WT/DS523 (May 8, 2019).
43. Panel Report, Australia — Anti-Dumping Measures on A4 Copy Paper, WTO Doc.
WT/DS529 (December 4, 2019).
44. Panel Report, United States — Anti-Dumping Measures Applying Differential
Pricing Methodology to Softwood Lumber from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS534 (October 16,
2019).
45. Panel Report, India — Export Related Measures, WTO Doc. WT/ DS541 (December
12, 2019).
46. Request for Consultations by the European Union, United States — Anti-dumping
and
Countervailing Duties on Ripe Olives from Spain, WTO Doc. WT/DS577/1 (Jan. 29,
2019).
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Parliament briefing paper notes on the case recognised the difficulties
facing the AB:
At the same time, owing to the blockage by the US of nominations
of WTO Appellate Body members, the dispute settlement system itself
is facing a severe backlog and risks becoming inoperable by the end of
2019.47
Other countries choose not to mention the impasse when bringing
complaints. For example, Australia requested consultations with India
over Indian sugarcane subsidies on 1 March 2019.48 A press release
from Simon Birmingham, the Minister for Trade, stated:
Australia launched formal WTO consultations against India in
February to seek the winding back of subsidies inconsistent with WTO
rules. Australia strongly supports the multilateral trading system, with
the WTO at its core.49
Why then are countries still using the WTO dispute settlement
system – whether they acknowledge the difficulties the AB is facing
or not? One reason could be the possible use of WTO consultations to
pressure other countries to change their behavior, whether or not a
panel is ever convened. For example, following the U.S. steel tariffs
in 2018, Canada50 and Mexico51 initiated WTO complaints. Canada
and Mexico were then able to get the United States to agree to drop the
tariffs on Canadian and Mexican steel in May 2019, and their WTO
complaints were subsequently withdrawn.52 However the success in
negotiating the withdrawal of U.S. tariffs could also be attributed to
counter tariffs that Canada and Mexico had placed on U.S. products –
counter tariffs that were themselves subject to WTO complaints from
47. JANA TITIEVSKAIA, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DUTIES ON
IMPORTS
OF
SPANISH
RIPE
OLIVES
2
(2019),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2019/635558/EPRS_ATA(2019)635
558_EN.pdf.
48. Request for Consultations by Australia, India — Measures Concerning Sugar and
Sugarcane, WTO Doc. WT/DS580/1 (Mar. 1, 2019).
49. Press Release, Simon Birmingham & Bridget McKenzie, Australia Takes Next Step
to Help Australian Sugar Industry, MINISTER FOR TRADE, TOURISM AND INV. (Jul. 12, 2019),
https://www.trademinister.gov.au/minister/simon-birmingham/media-release/australia-takesnext-step-help-australian-sugar-industry.
50. Request for Consultations by Canada, United States — Certain Measures on Steel
and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS550/1 (June 1, 2018).
51. Request for Consultations by Mexico, United States — Certain Measures on Steel
and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS551/1 (June 7, 2018).
52. Justine Coyne, Canada, Mexico Drop WTO Complaints on U.S. Metals Tariffs, S&P
GLOBAL (July 11, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latestnews/metals/071119-canada-mexico-drop-wto-complaints-on-us-metals-tariffs.
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the U.S.53
Another reason for the ongoing use of the WTO system may be
an attempt to preserve its functioning. To this end, the EU and Canada
entered into an agreement for an alternate, interim appeal process on
25 July 2019.54 The preamble to the agreement makes it clear that the
goal is to maintain the functioning of the WTO dispute settlement
system:
Determined to preserve the essential principles and features of the
WTO dispute settlement system which include its binding character
and two levels of adjudication through an independent and impartial
appellate review of panel reports…55
The EU and Canada thus continue to use the WTO dispute
settlement system for the panel stage. Under the agreement, if the AB
is unable to hear appeals ‘due to an insufficient number of its
members’56 neither the EU nor Canada will appeal the panel report, but
will instead take the matter to alternative arbitration. The alternative
arbitration is designed to ‘to replicate as closely as possible all
substantive and procedural aspects’ of the WTO AB and appellate
process,57 and its members are drawn from former AB members.58 In
a joint statement, the EU and Canada reaffirmed their shared desire to
preserve the WTO system:
An effective and binding dispute settlement system, which
provides for the possibility of appealing panel reports, seeks to
preserve the rights and obligations of WTO members.
This interim arrangement helps to preserve access to such a
system, promoting security and predictability in the resolution of WTO
disputes to ensure the stability of international trade.59

53. Request for Consultations by the United States, Canada — Additional Duties on
Certain Products from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS557/1 (July 16, 2018); Request
for Consultations by the United States, Mexico — Additional Duties on Certain Products from
the United States, WTO Doc. WT/D560/1 (July 16, 2018).
54. European Commission, Interim Appeal Arbitration Pursuant to Article 25 of the
DSU: Canada and the European Union, EUR. COMM’N (Jul. 25, 2019),
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/july/tradoc_158273.pdf.
55. Id. at pmbl.
56. Id. at 1.
57. Id. at art 2.
58. Id. at art 3.
59. European Commission, Joint Statement by the European Union and Canada on an
Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement, EUR. COMM’N (Jul. 25, 2019),
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2053.
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In October 2019, the EU and Norway entered into an identical
interim appeal agreement.60 The EU once again reaffirmed the primacy
of the WTO dispute settlement system in a statement on the agreement:
The EU’s foremost priority remains to ensure an effective
functioning of the existing WTO Appellate Body. The interim
arrangement has however become necessary as a contingency measure
given the long-standing blockage in the appointments of the Appellate
Body members.61
The EU’s actions in using the WTO dispute settlement system
despite the crippling of the AB are a push back against the United
States‘ own backlash: acts to make the system functional and render
the U.S. actions less powerful in their consequence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.S. backlash against the WTO AB can be understood as a
populist response – and indeed, there is evidence that backlashes
against international courts in general are more likely to be undertaken
by governments with populist policies.62 It is impossible to predict
now how the impasse will resolve. If there is a change of
administration at the U.S. election in November 2020, will a newly
elected President pursue the same AB tactics as the Trump
administration has? If a non-populist President is elected, and the
theory that backlash is caused by populist policies is correct, then it
would follow that the United States will cease blocking appointments
and allow the AB to function once again. There is precedent for
countries reembracing international courts and reversing backlashes
following the defeat of the populist government that initiated the
backlash.63 Yet the U.S. position may not be quite so simple. Blocking
of appointments did occur under the Obama administration, suggesting
the U.S. frustration with the AB may be bipartisan. However,
appointments were eventually made in all three cases – it is only under
President Trump, and his appointed trade representative Robert
Lighthizer that AB vacancies have not been filled. Nonetheless, the
60. European Commission, Interim Appeal Arbitration Pursuant to Article 25 of the
DSU: European Union and Norway, EUR. COMM’N (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/october/tradoc_158394.pdf.
61. European Commission, EU and Norway Agree on Interim Appeal System in Wake of
World Trade Organization Appellate Body blockage, EUR. COMM’N (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2074.
62. See generally Voeten, supra note 39.
63. Id. at 12.
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WTO is not popular with segments of U.S. voters, and even
Democratic candidates may not wish to seem too pro-WTO.
If the current situation does continue – either because of a Trump
victory in 2020 or a continuation of the policy by a new U.S. President
– the question becomes how will other countries respond? The EU
actions in simultaneously embracing the WTO panel system and
providing an alternate means for appeal show one route where the
consequences of backlash is deliberately minimized. It is possible that
more countries will join the EU alternate system – just as Norway did
in October 2019. It may reach a point where the AB alternative has
enough membership to form a critical mass, causing other countries to
join for fear of being left out. The United States is, after all, just one of
the 164 members of the WTO. Although its economy and impact on
global trade is huge, there is a legitimate question as to whether it
would want to be a perpetual outsider to a system that contained the
EU and, perhaps in the future, countries such as China, Brazil and
India. While the current impasse means such countries cannot gain
binding judgments from the WTO DSB about US policies, this effect
cuts both ways: the United States is no longer able to challenge
Chinese tariffs on U.S. goods in the WTO and receive a binding
decision. It should also be noted that the United States agreed to the
formation of the current system during the Uruguay round – and
although support for the AB was ‘lukewarm’64, the United States was
committed in the early days of the WTO to ‘ensuring that the system
worked’.65 A functioning WTO dispute settlement system was, until
fairly recently, seen to be in the United States‘
own interests.
In 1950, the allied powers decided there was no point in pursuing
an International Trade Organization without U.S. involvement. 70
years on, the world economy is very different. Further, countries have
had 25 years of experience with a binding trade dispute settlement
system – an experience that countries have for the most part seen as
positive – and it is not at all clear that WTO members will fall in line
with the U.S. position this time. Far from causing a retreat from the
WTO, the U.S. backlash has thus far been met with renewed embrace
of the institution and its dispute settlement system from other WTO
members. Ironically, the United States is not alone in its calls for WTO
reform.66 However its choice to force the hand of other WTO members
64. Gregory Shaffer et al., The Extensive (But Fragile) Authority of the WTO Appellate
Body, 79 L. & CONT. PROBS. 237, 245 (2016).
65. Id. at 249.
66. Michael Smith, Australia Calls on China to Collaborate on WTO Reform, FINANCIAL
REVIEW (Aug. 2. 2019), https://www.afr.com/world/asia/australia-calls-on-china-to-
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by blocking AB appointments may mean it is ultimately left without a
bargaining chip, as other countries continue to use the WTO dispute
settlement system despite the U.S. actions.

collaborate-on-wto-reform-20190801-p52d0a.

